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LIFE IN THE SECOND YUGOSLAVIA 
THROUGH THE PRISM OF SELECTED 
INDICATORS (The Slovenian Experience)*
Aleksander LORENČIČ**
The discussion sheds light on the main milestones and developments in 
the economic life of Slovenia and Slovenians in the time of the Second 
Yugoslavia. On the basis of selected indicators the author underlines 
the differences between Slovenia and Yugoslavia at various stages of 
development after World War II. 
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The outlooks on the historical experience vary, and they change with the 
passage of time. It is a fact that Slovenians have always formed an almost mythi-
cal attitude to every state they have lived in. The same is true of the Second 
Yugoslavia. For decades Slovenia has been affected by a phenomenon that 
economists know as “the Gulliver Effect”. This is a phenomenon when a smaller 
weaker state and its economy adapt to the standards of a larger and stronger 
state, which can be either a neighbouring state or an economic community. In 
the opinion of the economist Neven Borak, Slovenia has known two such “Gul-
livers”: the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the subsequent Yugoslavia.1 Since 
* The scientific symposium entitled Slovenia in Yugoslavia took place in Ljubljana on 28 and 
29 November. Here the author presented his paper “Kako smo živeli v drugi Jugoslaviji: oris 
dogajanja v luči izbranih kazalnikov” [“How We Lived in the Second Yugoslavia: Description 
of Events in Light of Selected Indicators”]. The following discussion is an updated and revised 
version of the author's work published in Slovenian: “Kako smo živeli v drugi Jugoslaviji: oris 
dogajanja v luči izbranih kazalnikov”, in: Zdenko Čepič (ed.), Slovenija v Jugoslaviji, (Ljubljana, 
2015), pp. 131-144. 
** Aleksander Lorenčič, Ph.D., Institute for Contemporary History, Ljubljana, Slovenia
1 Neven Borak: Iskanje Guliverja ali kako preživeti [Searching for Gulliver or How to Survive], 
(Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče, Zbirka Forum,  1994), p. 7. Hereinafter: Borak: 
Iskanje Guliverja ali kako preživeti.
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the attainment of its independence, Slovenia’s priority was the accession to the 
European Union.2 In the 1980s and during its emancipation, Yugoslavia be-
came an “obstacle” for the Slovenian development, self-management socialism 
as the best system became a totalitarianism, comrade Tito became a dictator, 
and brotherhood and unity came to an end. European Union became the new 
goal, as we have already mentioned. Once again this integration was seen in an 
idolised manner, but recently – in the time of the economic and financial cri-
sis – this image has been decaying. People are often dissatisfied. They find that 
they have imagined Slovenia and life in it after its emancipation differently, and 
so on. We frequently hear how life during socialism and in the Second Yugo-
slavia was better, how everyone had jobs, etc. 
In May 1945, as the new authorities rose to power, new goals and plans 
emerged. The economy was taken over by the communists, who, among other 
things, undertook a high-priority industrialisation and introduced the central-
ly-planned economy with the nationalisation of property.3 Slovenia entered the 
second Yugoslav state as the economically most developed region, and it also 
managed to retain this role.4 Until 1974 its possibilities for the realisation of its 
national economic interests were quite limited, but this changed with the 1974 
Constitution. Slovenia excelled in many areas, especially exports, productivity, 
and effectiveness of investments. Its ratio of domestic product in the context 
of Yugoslavia was between 15 and 17 percent, while its share of industry and 
exports was approximately 25 percent. In comparison with Slovenia, Yugosla-
via fell behind more and more notably with each passing decade. According 
to the available information, in 1958 Yugoslavia's lag behind Slovenia, as seen 
through the prism of economic development, was already 17 years and a half. 
With less than one tenth of the population, Slovenia accounted for one fifth of 
the Yugoslav gross domestic product and a quarter of the total exports.5
Average annual levels of domestic labour productivity growth in the soci-
ety by sectors in the period between 1953 and 1973 (in %)
Economy Primary sector Secondary sector Tertiary sector
4.8 3.9 5 4.3
Source: Slovenija 1945-1975 [Slovenia 1945-1975]. Zavod SR Slovenije za statistiko. Lju-
bljana 1974, p. 149. 
2 Archives of the Republic of Slovenia, collection 1994 (Služba vlade Republike Slovenije za 
evropske zadeve – SVEZ / Government Office for European Affairs), box 2/98. 
3 Jože Prinčič: Slovensko gospodarstvo v drugi Jugoslaviji [Slovenian Economy in the Second 
Yugoslavia], (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 1997), p. 5. 
4 Jože Prinčič: Pot do slovenske narodnogospodarske suverenosti 1945–1991 [Path Towards the 
Slovenian National Economic Sovereignty], (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2013), p. 15. 
5 Bogomir Kovač: “Obsojeni na uspeh? [Destined to Succeed?]”, Mladina, 26 (24 June 2006), 34. 
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The percentage of active population, employed in the secondary sector, 
climbed from 28 percent in 1953 to 49 percent in 1981. The tertiary sector 
saw similar development, but with reverse dynamics: until 1971 the percentage 
increased moderately (from 18 to 26 percent), but then, in 1981, it climbed to 
36 percent.6 The services sector, which included trade, tourism and hospitality 
industry, financial, business and state services, had as much as a 54 percent 
share in 1990 (still 45 percent in 1987).7
Globally Slovenia was at the very top as far as the percentage of the em-
ployed of the whole or active population of Slovenia was concerned, as well as 
with regard to the percentage of people working in industry and mining. On 
the other hand, it was far from the top in terms of labour productivity, educa-
tional structure and living standard.8
Industrialisation level in Slovenia
Year (of the 
census)
Number of active 
workers
Number of active 
industry workers
Percentage of active 
industry workers (in 
%)
1961 768,424 192,423 25.04
1971 719,339 270,410 37.59
1981 753,167 328,522 43.62
1991 878,789 314,034 35.73
2002 818,304 257,157 31.43
Source: Igor Vrišer, “Slovenska industrija po osamosvojitvi” [“Slovenian Industry after the 
Attainment of Independence”], IB Revija, 2 (2008), (Ljubljana: UMAR), 66. 
From reform to reform
At the beginning of the 1960s it became obvious that the economic system 
and the related decisive role of the state in the formation and realisation of 
the economic policy were the main obstacles for the swifter development and 
better integration into the international division of labour. At that time the 
6 Marijan Klemenčič: “Družbenogospodarski prehod v Sloveniji” [“Socio-economic Transi-
tion in Slovenia”], in: Dušan Plut: Geografija in aktualna vprašanja prostorskega razvoja: 70 let 
geografije na ljubljanski univerzi [Geography and the Current Issues of Spatial Development: 70 
Years of Geography at the Ljubljana University], (Ljubljana: Oddelek za geografijo Filozofske 
fakultete, 1989), pp. 231-232. 
7 Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development (ZMAR), Workbook, 1 (1992), no. 2: 
26–29.
8 Pavle Sicherl: “Kje je Slovenija?” [“Where Is Slovenia?”] In: Jože Mencinger (ed.): Aleksander 
Bajt 1921-2000: Zbornik razprav s simpozija SAZU ob 10-letnici smrti [Aleksander Bajt 1921-
2000: Collection of Discussions from the Symposium of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts at the 10th Anniversary of Death], Razprave 25, (Ljubljana: SAZU, 2011), p. 136.
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realisation was reached that the economic system would have to be altered in 
such a manner as to allow for a more liberal functioning of the market laws, 
the internal price relations should promote exports as far as possible, the state 
interventions in the economy should be limited, and the companies should be 
more independent in the distribution of their profits.9 The so-called small re-
form or new economic regime represented an introduction into the economic 
transformation. It began in January 1960, when the Federal Executive Council 
and the Federal Assembly adopted the legislation for the transformation of the 
foreign currency, foreign trade, credit and banking system in order to intro-
duce new price relations and change the distribution of income. Unfortunately 
it turned out, already in the very first year, that the reform would not come to 
fruition. After the unsuccessful reform the episode with the seven-year eco-
nomic plan was another indicator that Yugoslavia could by no means come to 
a single decision about the developmental orientation. After the unsuccessful 
reform in the beginning of the 1960s the central economic problems like the 
instability of the internal market, low productivity and deficient production 
links between the basic and other industry remained unsolved.10 
Share of industry and private sector in the domestic product by republics 
in 1973
Industry Private sector
Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia
36 18.5





Serbia Proper 34.1 22.1
Vojvodina 30.9 23.1
Kosovo 33.7 27.6
Source: Slovenija 1945-1975 [Slovenia 1945-1975], (Ljubljana: Zavod SR Slovenije za statis-
tiko, 1974), p. 170. 
9 Jože Prinčič: Slovensko gospodarstvo v drugi Jugoslaviji [Slovenian Economy in the Second 
Yugoslavia], (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 1997), p. 56.
10 Aleksander Lorenčič: Gospodarske razmere v Jugoslaviji v obdobju 1968 – 1988: na poti v 
razpad [Economic Situation in Yugoslavia in the Period from 1968 to 1988: On the Way to Dis-
solution], pp. 261–262. 
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A new reform started on 24 July 1965, when Boris Kraigher presented its 
foundations and goals in the Federal Assembly. In the introduction he present-
ed three processes on which it was supposedly based. The first process would 
allegedly facilitate exports, the second one would change the income relations, 
while the third one would consolidate the efforts for the restoration of the 
realistic levels of all forms of consumption. The main measures envisioned by 
the 1965 reform included the change of the price ratios, strengthening of the 
tertiary economic sector, modernisation of the system of international eco-
nomic relations, restrictive credit policy, changes of the tax system and tax 
policy, balancing consumption with income, convertibility of the national cur-
rency, and different attitude to the undeveloped republics and regions.11 In the 
first two years the economic reform had a considerable amount of positive 
effects: prices, living expenses and inflation stabilised, investments and the 
role of state in the management of company income reduced, productivity and 
personal income increased, and the restructuring of economy and introduc-
tion of new technologies began. However, already in the second half of 1967 
the enthusiasm for the realisation of the economic reform programme dimin-
ished. In December 1966, about a month before his death, Boris Kraigher told 
Stane Kavčič that the reform would fall through as it did not have enough ac-
tual ideological-political support. And this is what eventually happened. After 
Kraigher's death the reform efforts slowed at first, and then came to a complete 
halt. The 1965 economic reform is frequently seen as an especially important 
development. It has been pronounced as the best-prepared programme of eco-
nomic transformation attempted in the time of the second Yugoslav state. The 
supporters of this reform were convinced that in case of its realisation the fate 
of Yugoslavia would have been completely different. The aggrandisement of 
this reform makes it harder to discover its actual role. Namely, it is an indisput-
able fact that this reform was completely unsuccessful and that its main goal 
– to transform the economy into a modern self-management market economy 
– was not realised. In the middle of the 1980s the economist Aleksander Bajt 
wrote that the planners of the reform were not yet capable of comprehending 
the decisive importance of market for the economic life. They saw the market 
narrow-mindedly, which is why the prices of the products they paid most at-
tention to never achieved their economic levels.12
11 Jože Prinčič, Neven Borak: Iz reforme v reformo: Slovensko gospodarstvo 1970 – 1991 [From 
Reform to Reform: Slovenian Economy 1970 – 1991], (Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, 
2006), pp. 127–130. 
12 Franjo Štiblar: “Razvoj trgov Ex-Jugoslavije” [“Development of the Former Yugoslav Mar-
kets”], in: Gospodarska gibanja, 12 (1995), no. 267, (Ljubljana: Ekonomski inštitut pravne 
fakultete): 23–43. 
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Domestic product per capita and unemployment levels in the SFRY in the 
period between 1960 and 1990 
Year
Domestic product per capita (in 
thousands of dinars, 1972 prices)
Unemployment level in %
SFRY SLO SFRY SLO
1960 6.43 11.61 1.41 0.84
1965 8.50 15.60 1.98 0.90
1970 10.92 21.15 2.49 1.55
1975 14.10 28.71 3.99 0.89
1980 17.76 35.23 5.44 0.90
1985 17.72 35.56 6.90 1.18
1990 15.31 30.82 7.81 2.23
Source: Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije [Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia] (various years).
*According to the records, Slovenia had the lowest level of unemployment and highest 
value of domestic product per capita of all the former republics of the SFRY.
When the 1965 reform fell through, several federal as well as republican 
stabilisation programmes were drawn up. In the first half of the 1970s the eco-
nomic development in Yugoslavia was unequal, while economic movements 
were cyclical and uneven.  Periods of stable and unstable economic move-
ments followed each other. The efforts to control the situation reached their 
peak with the constitution of 197413, which had a double character, since on 
one hand it moved towards decentralising the state and the economic system, 
while on the other hand it tended to strengthen the communist “Party” as the 
leading state political force. The 1974 constitution was an important turning 
point in the development of Yugoslavia and “many saw it as one of the most 
important reasons for the dissolution of the state as well as for its economic 
problems”.14 The new constitution adopted the concept of self-management 
based on associated labour. According to the constitution the socialist social 
order was based on the “authority of the working class and all the working 
people as well as on the relations between the people as free and equal man-
ufacturers and producers whose work is intended exclusively to satisfy their 
personal and common needs”.15 Thus the constitution had a twofold charac-
ter: on one hand it addressed the organisation of the federation and its func-
tioning by strengthening the role of the republics and provinces as well as by 
13 Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, No. 09, 21 February 1974.
14 Neven Borak: Ekonomski vidiki delovanja in razpada Jugoslavije [Economic Aspects of the 
Functioning and Dissolution of Yugoslavia],  (Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče, 
Zbirka Spekter, 2002), p. 192. (hereinafter: Borak: Ekonomski vidiki delovanja in razpada Jugo-
slavije).
15 Branko Petranović: Istorija Jugoslavije 1918 – 1978 [History of Yugoslavia 1918 – 1978], X, 
(Belgrade:  Nolit, 1980), p. 597. 
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reducing the role of “centralism”, while on the other hand it emphasised the 
class-oriented, so-called labour-defined character of the Yugoslav society and 
state with precise normative regulation of socio-economic relations, based on 
self-management and associated labour.”The new constitution has no pretenc-
es of creating an ideal democratic system,” Edvard Kardelj said at the session 
of the Commission for Constitutional Questions in May 1973, and added that 
its main purpose was to provide the “working class with a strong and efficient 
weapon in order to facilitate its better organisation”.16 In reality this was not so. 
The constitution of 1974 may have set out that the state could only get involved 
in companies when the socially-owned property had to be protected (from 
losses or bankruptcy), but in reality the organisations of the League of Com-
munists and the Trade Union existed in the companies and exerted political 
influence on the business decisions of the managers. Thus the economic rela-
tions between the companies became completely political relations between 
the state and the companies, while the lack of the market system repeatedly 
called for constant state interventionism. The actual division of power in the 
companies was far less democratic as the self-management normative system 
portrayed it: the political authorities had a leading role, the managers had an 
important influence due to their business information, while the workers as 
the formal protagonists of self-management were in fact powerless and in a 
subordinate position.17
In the middle of the 1970s a new manner of social planning came into 
existence, based on the idea that the functioning of market laws could be more 
efficiently replaced by the self-management agreements between companies. 
The foundation for this idea was the Associated Labour Act18, adopted by the 
Federal Assembly in November 1976, which soon started to be referred to as 
the “lesser constitution”. The economic system, according to which the newly 
transformed socialist companies (the TOZD, OZD and SOZD organisations 
of associated labour) were supposed to bring their mutual interests in line and 
set out their mutual rights and responsibilities, did not come to life. Mock-
ingly, economists referred to this system as the “agreed economy”. Naturally, 
the aspiration to have companies reach agreements with each other instead 
of competing is contradictory to the logic of the market economy. Thus the 
16 Zdenko Čepič: “Ustava 1974: preureditev jugoslovanske federacije, delegatski sistem in 
dogovorna ekonomija” [“The 1974 Constitution: Transformation of the Yugoslav Federation, 
System of Delegates and Agreed Economy”] in: Slovenska novejša zgodovina 2, Od programa 
Zedinjena Slovenija do mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije 1848 – 1992 [Slovenian 
Contemporary History: from the United Slovenia Programme to the International Recognition of 
Slovenia: 1848-1992], (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga Založba and Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 
2005), pp. 1094–1104.
17 Bogomir Kovač: Rekviem za socializem: Ekonomske reforme v socialističnih državah [Req-
uiem for Socialism: Economic Reforms in the Socialist Countries], (Ljubljana: DZS, 1990), pp. 
152–153. 
18 Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, No. 53, 3 December 1976.
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companies kept becoming less and less competitive abroad as well as at home, 
while the prices kept increasing gradually but constantly.19
The crisis in the 1980s ultimately revealed the powerlessness of the social-
ist economy. However, it took almost a decade to reach the realisation that it 
could not be reformed.20 The disintegration resulted from the establishment of 
the normal state of conflicting interests and the realisation that “there was no 
Tito after Tito”.21 The attempts to solve the crisis resembled the efforts to put out 
a fire rather than the search for the true reasons for the crisis. On one hand the 
governments decided to implement restrictive measures with regard to supply, 
while on the other hand they attempted to reach compromises regarding the 
economic system changes. Even though discussions about market economy and 
the so-called market mechanisms became increasingly frequent, agreed econ-
omy remained in force.22 Dr. Janez Drnovšek, President of the Presidency of 
SFRY and long-time President of the Government and President of the Repub-
lic of Slovenia, agreed that the 1980s were the time when a conceptual change 
took place and when the people started believing in and pursuing the values 
characteristic of the Western world. He said: “It was an awakening, not only in 
Slovenia, but in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe. In Slovenia the aspira-
tions for changes were largely brought about by the backwardness and lack of 
prospects that the previous regime and the former state exhibited, especially in 
the last decade of their existence. It became obvious that there was no way out.”23 
How we lived in the Second Yugoslavia
Until 1952 the salaries were regulated by the state. Salaries in the indi-
vidual industries were the same all around the country. After 1952 the sala-
ries increased (the system of calculation according to the tariff rules and 
participation of workers in the profits was introduced).24 The ratio between 
19 Aleksander Lorenčič: Gospodarske razmere v Jugoslaviji v obdobju 1968 – 1988: na poti v 
razpad [Economic Situation in Yugoslavia in the Period from 1968 to 1988: On the Way to Dis-
solution], pp. 267–268, (hereinafter: Lorenčič: Gospodarske razmere).
20 To find out more about the developments in the 1980s and later see: Aleksander Lorenčič: 
Prelom s starim in začetek novega. Tranzicija slovenskega gospodarstva iz socializma v kapitalizem 
(1990-2004) [A Break with the Old and the Beginning of Something New: Slovenian Economic 
Transition from Socialism to Capitalism (1990–2004)], (Ljubljana: INZ,  2012), pp. 39-60. Here-
inafter: Lorenčič: Prelom s starim in začetek novega. 
21 Jože Mencinger: “Slovensko gospodarstvo med centralizmom in neodvisnostjo” [“Slovenian 
Economy between Centralism and Independence”], Nova Revija, 3 (1995), no. 95: 490–495, 
(hereinafter: Mencinger: “Slovensko gospodarstvo med centralizmom in neodvisnostjo”).
22 Čepič, Gospodarska kriza [Economic Crisis], pp. 1151–1153.
23 Jože Možina, “'Politika postane manj pomembna'. Pogovor z Janezom Drnovškom” [“'Poli-
tics Should Be Less Important'. A Discussion with Janez Drnovšek”]. Revija Ampak, 4 (April 
2003), no. 4: 26–30, (hereinafter: Možina, “Politika postane  manj pomembna”).
24 Slovenija 1945-1975 [Slovenia 1945-1975], (Ljubljana: Zavod SR Slovenije za statistiko, 1974), 
p. 161.
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the personal income of unqualified workers and highly qualified workers was 
1:2.76 in 1963 and 1:2.38 in 1973.25  
In the period between 1955 and 1964 the living expenses increased by an 
average annual growth level of 7.9 percent. The average annual level of living 
expenses increase in the period between 1965 and 1974 was 16.4 percent. The 
economic reform of 1965 resulted in a significant increase of living expenses. 
In comparison with the earlier year, in 1965 the increase in expenses amount-
ed to 31.5 percent, in 1966 it was 23 percent, in 1967 7.8 percent, and after that 
the expenses stabilised. Food expenses in the period between 1955 and 1964 
increased by an average growth level of 9.3 percent, while between 1965 and 
1975 this increase amounted to 17.2 percent. Food had the majority share in 
the joint living expenses index.26
Retail prices kept increasing, especially after 1962 and during the 1965 
economic reform (28 percent increase). The living standard kept improving 
from decade to decade. Healthcare strengthened and the number of healthcare 
professionals increased as well, which resulted in a better quality of life, also in 
diminished mortality and morbidity of the population. In the years from 1964 
to 1972 the number of persons with health insurance increased, amounting to 
1040 insured persons per thousand people in 1972 (the numbers include those 
who worked abroad or workers who had their permanent residence elsewhere 
and were thus not included in the population census).27
Monetary resources of working families of four (monthly average)
1966 1970 1974
Available resources 1501 3194 5853
Living expenses (in 
dinars)
1213 2364 4374
Source: Slovenija 1945-1975 [Slovenia 1945-1975], (Ljubljana: Zavod SR Slovenije za statis-
tiko, 1974), p. 170. 
Since the 1960s it was possible to acquire passports. Thus it was possible 
to “head into the world” to travel or find a better life. Slovenians used to 
shop abroad in large numbers, and processions of vehicles waited to cross 
the Austrian and Italian borders on both sides. In the 1980s restrictions were 
implemented. The authorities introduced vouchers for the basic necessities. 
The use of automobiles was first restricted with regard to their registration 
number according to the so-called “even – odd” system, and then gasoline 
vouchers were introduced as well. Restrictions were also put in place with regard 
25 Ibid., p. 164.
26 Ibid., pp. 172-173.
27 Ibid., pp. 173-174.
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to imports, especially of the so-called “luxury goods” (exotic fruits, coffee, 
imported alcoholic drinks, foreign magazines and newspapers, and cosmetics).28
Citizens would cross the border to buy certain articles for foreign curren-
cies and “smuggle” them home. Deposits were introduced (charges for cross-
ing the border), but it often happened that people wired these sums to their 
own instead of the state accounts (customs officers did not check the account 
numbers on the money order forms).29 Instead of the state importing coffee, 
washing powder, jeans and so on it allowed the money to go abroad and fill the 
foreign budgets. Towards the end of Yugoslavia the capitalist system was seen 
“with envy”. Citizens wished for the freedoms that the Germans and Austrians 
enjoyed. People dreamed about the United States, Germany, and Austria (idol-
ised perception: migrant workers in these countries would come home driving 
Mercedeses and BMWs). 
After the collapse of Yugoslavia, between 1989 and 1992 Slovenia saw a 
significant decline in activity and faced an urgent reorientation from the Yugo-
slav to the Western markets.30 As far as the level of GDP was concerned, it took 
more than eight years to restore the level from 1989. In the statistical sense the 
1992 GDP level amounted to less than 80 percent of the level from 1989, but in 
the temporal sense it fell to the level of around 1976, i.e. by some 16 years. In 
all of the transition countries, the transformation to the capitalist and market 
economy resulted in profound shocks and diminished production.  Already in 
the period between 1989 and 1992, the cumulative decrease of the gross do-
mestic product in Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland amounted 
to approximately 20 percent, and the decline of industrial production was even 
greater. In view of the relative differences and temporal distances from the 
compared countries of the European Community before the transition period, 
the relative position of Slovenia in terms of gross domestic product per capita 
worsened significantly: in 1991 Slovenia lagged behind Italy by 30 years, Spain 
by 19 years, Ireland by 13 years, Portugal by around 6 years, only in compari-
son with Greece it had a year's advantage according to this indicator.31 
28 Božo Repe, Slovenci v osemdesetih letih [Slovenians in the 1980s], Zbirka zgodovinskega 
časopisa – 23, (Ljubljana: Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije, 2001), pp. 10–12, (hereinafter: 
Repe, Slovenci v osemdesetih letih). 
29 Ibid., pp. 10-12.
30 For more details about the transition of the Slovenian economy see: Lorenčič, Prelom s starim 
in začetek novega. 
31 Pavle, Sicherl, Scenariji gospodarskega razvoja Slovenije – približevanje Evropi. Splošni pogoji 
za gospodarski razvoj: Strategija gospodarskega razvoja Slovenije [Scenarios of Slovenian Eco-
nomic Development – Approximation to Europe: General Conditions for Economic Development. 
Strategy of Slovenian Economic Development], (Ljubljana: Zavod Republike Slovenije za makroe-
konomske analize in razvoj, 1995), pp. 333–350.
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Differences between Slovenia and Yugoslavia according to the selected in-
dicators and years of the Second Yugoslavia





















Relative differences between Slovenia and Yugoslavia (YUG=100)
1952 172 175 109 135 / / /
1961 187 160 127 128 366 182 191
1964 185 167 122 119 357 179 219
1979 206 171 130 120 209 187 148
1988 202 150 140 136 211 165 136
1989 200 149 / / 203 168 132
Time lag of the former Yugoslavia behind Slovenia (in years)
1960 7,3 / 5,2 / 3,3 / /
1964 7,4 10,7 4 / 4,8 7,8 1,2
1966 8,7 13,6 3,8 2,2 5,3 6,5 2,3
1979 11,8 20,5 9,3 4,4 8,2 5,8 6,9
1987 19,3 26,2 19,1 8,5 14,1 7 13,7
1988 20,8 27,3 20,4 9 14,9 7,1 14,9
1989 21,2 28,4 / / 15,2 7,2 15,9
Source: Pavle Sicherl: “Kje je Slovenija?” [“Where is Slovenia?”] in: Jože Mencinger (ed.): 
Aleksander Bajt 1921-2000: Zbornik razprav s simpozija SAZU ob 10-letnici smrti, Razprave 25, 
(Ljubljana: SAZU, 2011), p. 136. The employment indicators (employed people per working age 
person), productivity (domestic product per employed person) and equipment (fixed assets per 
employed person), as shown by Sicherl, are only related to the social sector and do not include 
the private sector. 
European Union = Yugoslav syndrome?
The transition to market and national economy after 1990 gave rise to pro-
found structural changes, marking the transformation from the socially-owned 
to private ownership, from industrial to service economy, from large to small 
companies, the reorientation from the former Yugoslav market to the markets 
of the states more demanding in terms of prices and quality, as well as the final 
transition from the economy of supply to the economy of demand (especially 
in the labour market).32 For such a small national economy as the Slovenian 
32 Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development (ZMAR), Workbook, No. 6, year III, 
1994, p. 2.
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one, which, to make matters worse, also separated itself from the large Yugo-
slav market, the reorientation towards foreign markets represented a path to-
wards stable economic growth and development. This primarily depended on 
international recognition. Until the end of 1991 Slovenia was recognised only 
by ten countries, but after 15 January 1992, when the European Union member 
states recognised it, the number of recognitions increased drastically.33
Today Slovenia is a full European Union Member State, which, howev-
er, faces many problems. What we already know from historical experience 
turned out to be true also in the case of the European Union. The global eco-
nomic and financial crisis revealed certain inconsistencies and weaknesses of 
this community. We have witnessed numerous discussions and proposals with 
regard to what kind of measures to adopt, how to solve the problems, and what 
Europe should be like in the future. Let us remember the discussions of the 
so-called Kraigher Commission in Yugoslavia and the like. We can see more 
than a few similarities between the problems faced by the European Union 
and the Second Yugoslavia. Whether these comparisons are relevant or not is 
a matter of discussion, but they exist nevertheless. In case of European Union 
certain experts even talk about the so-called Yugoslav Syndrome. “Yugoslav 
Syndrome will appear in the European Union: who lives on account of some-
one else, or who is taking advantage of whom,” the economist Jože Mencinger 
stated in 2010, and this has been completely obvious in the example of Greece.34 
As we have already mentioned, there are several similarities between the 
European Union and Second Yugoslavia. Marković's35 outlook on Yugoslavia 
is very meaningful: he envisioned it as a “convoy” in which the speed has to 
be adapted to the slowest ship. Jürgen Habermas said the same thing of the 
European Union a few years ago: in his opinion it is a very unusual convoy, 
and its speed is always determined by the slowest vehicle. We can often hear 
discussions about Europe of two or more speeds. In any case, it is a fact that the 
European Union is facing difficulties due to the differences between developed 
and less developed regions, just as the socialist Yugoslavia once has. Besides 
the unsuccessful economic system one of the key reasons for the Yugoslav eco-
nomic problems were also the significant differences in its development, and 
everyone saw the possible solutions in their own way. Yugoslavia constantly at-
tempted to reduce the differences in the levels of development with the policy 
according to the system of “the developed for the less developed”. Thus the 
33 Peter Vodopivec, Od Pohlinove slovnice do samostojne države. Slovenska zgodovina od konca 
18. do konca 20. stoletja [From Pohlin’s Grammar to the Independent State: Slovenian History from 
the End of the 18th Century until the End of the 20th Century]. (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2010), p. 457.
34 Janez Tomažič, “Ekonomist Jože Mencinger je prepričan, da se bodo v EU začeli spraševati, 
kdo živi na čigav račun” [“Economist Jože Mencinger is convinced that the EU states will start 
asking themselves who lives on whose account”]. Finance.si, 7 May 2010. Accessible at: http://
www.finance.si/278974/Mencinger-V-EU-se-bo-pojavil-jugoslovanski-sindrom, (10 March 
2014)
35 Ante Marković, last President of the Federal Executive Council. 
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Loans Fund intended for the swifter development of the economically under-
developed republics and autonomous provinces (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo) was established already in the middle of 
1965. The funds were collected as a percentage of the domestic product of the 
social sector. This was another mistake of the economic policy. As it was, the 
underdeveloped did not take the responsibility for their own economic devel-
opment: they only invested their own resources in the development of certain 
areas, while supposing that all other development and investments were in the 
Yugoslav domain. The underdeveloped did not repay their debt, and they often 
used the resources they had received for non-economic purposes. The same 
turned out to be true in the case of the aforementioned Loans Fund. Develop-
mental differences in Yugoslavia amounted to the ratio of 1:7. In practice this 
meant that Slovenia was seven times as developed as Kosovo. Slovenia as the 
most developed republic invested most resources, and due to the worsening 
economic conditions it renounced its participation in the Fund in the middle 
of the 1980s.36 As the most developed republic Slovenia’s contribution to the 
aforementioned Loans Fund was the greatest. It was a kind of investment that 
never saw any returns. The European Union knows a similar mechanism as 
well – the fund assisting the indebted states or states that face a crisis, called the 
permanent European Stability Mechanism. It is very significant that Slovenia 
contributes 2.8 percent of its GDP to the mechanisms providing assistance to 
the Eurogroup states, which is the largest percentage of assistance in terms of 
GDP of all the members of the European Monetary Union. In 2012 Germany 
contributed 56.09 billion euros for the solving of the euro-related problems, 
which is the largest actual amount of money intended for solving the problems 
of the euro zone countries.  However, according to the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities, Eurostat, this share only represents 2.1 percent of the 
German gross domestic product.37 Debt is a serious problem in the Europe-
an Union, and the same was true of Yugoslavia. Namely, the Yugoslav federal 
governments attempted to solve the crises with borrowing as well. The largest 
increase in borrowing took place between 1977 and 1982, when the federal 
government was led by Veselin Djuranović. The reasons for such borrowing 
lied in the significant worsening of the current part of the balance of payments. 
The trade shortage increased from 1.7 billion dollars in 1973 to as much as 7.9 
billion dollars in 1979. Furthermore, the indebtedness was also influenced by 
the ambitious investment goals of the five-year national plan for the period 
from 1976 to 1980, which involved extensive construction projects. Between 
1982 and 1986 the President of the Government Milka Planinc from Croatia 
wanted to put things in order by pursuing a very resolute policy, but she was 
36 Lorenčič, Gospodarske razmere, pp. 270–271. 
37 “Slovenija je najradodarnejša pri reševanju pomoči potrebnih evrih težav” [Slovenia is the 
Most Generous in Saving the Eurogroup States that Need Help]. MMC RTV SLO. Accessible 
at: http://www.rtvslo.si/evropska-unija/slovenija-je-najradodarnejsa-pri-resevanju-pomoci-
potrebnih-evrskih-drzav/321553, (21 March 2014).
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too weak and had to keep yielding to the extreme social pressures and interests 
of the individual republics.38 One of the most important economic experts at 
the time Aleksander Bajt said about her that she might have actually succeeded 
in putting the situation in order eventually, if only they let her work.39 One of 
the consequences of the severe indebtedness was that the pressures of foreign 
creditors, demanding that the debt be repaid, were increasing, reaching the 
climax in the years between 1986 and 1988, when Branko Mikulić was the 
President of the Federal Government. The main problem lied in the fact that 
the International Monetary Fund dictated the economic policy. It forced the 
federal government to abandon the supervision of prices, pursue a restrictive 
policy in relation to wages and loans, and bring down the expenses of the pub-
lic sector.40 Also here we can find similarities with the current state of affairs 
in Slovenia. We can often hear threats involving the arrival of the so-called 
“Troika”. It is ironic that besides the individual European Union states the Eu-
ropean government itself has significant problems. As it happened, in October 
2012 the European Parliament approved an additional 2.7 billion euros to the 
European Commission: without it the European government would have run 
out of money in the middle of November.41
The Slovenian economic position in the Second Yugoslavia was not much 
different from the position in the First Yugoslavia. Nevertheless Slovenia had 
been and remained the economically most developed and successful part of 
the Yugoslav state. As Peter Vodopivec wrote, “communism – in Yugoslavia 
as well as elsewhere – managed to modernise and improve the social and eco-
nomic conditions, but it could not – as the American economist John Kenneth 
Galbraith underlined – decrease the economic lag behind the Western neigh-
bouring states”.42 The Yugoslav economic crisis certainly had a significant in-
fluence on the dissolution of Yugoslavia. It is a fact that the economic position 
in which Yugoslavia found itself was an important factor of the dissatisfaction 
of the Yugoslav nations. It is completely understandable that the economic cir-
38 Repe, Slovenci v osemdesetih letih, pp. 10–12.
39 Viktor Meier, Zakaj je razpadla Jugoslavija [Why Yugoslavia Fell Apart], (Ljubljana: Znan-
stveno in publicistično središče, 1996), pp. 26–43.
40 Jože Prinčič, “Gospodarski vidiki osamosvajanja Slovenije (1986–1991)” [“Economic As-
pects of Slovenian Emancipation (1986–1991)”], in: Slovenska osamosvojitev 1991 [Slovenian 
Independence 1991]. Testimonies and analyses, symposium in Brežice, collection of scientific 
texts, (Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije: Državni zbor, 2002), pp. 33–56.  
41 Evropski poslanci komisijo rešili pred praznim računom [European Members of Parliament 
Save the Commission from an Empty Account]. Dnevni.si (24 October 2013). Accessible at: http://
www.times.si/svet/evropski-poslanci-komisijo-resili-pred-praznim-racunom-131cb96f88-43dc-
9bac43.html, (17 April 2014). 
42 Peter Vodopivec, Od Pohlinove slovnice do samostojne države. Slovenska zgodovina od konca 
18. stoletja do konca 20. stoletja [From Pohlin’s Grammar to the Independent State: Slovenian 
History from the End of the 18th Century until the End of the 20th Century], (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 
2002), p. 385.  
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cumstances “created a fertile ground for the kindling of economic and political 
nationalism as well as for the mutual accusations with regard to exploitation”.43 
Regarding the difficulties we can currently witness in the context of the Euro-
pean Union, among them quite a few that remind us of the Second Yugoslavia, 
we can only hope that the European Union will be able to face all the chal-
lenges and problems, and that it will not end up like Yugoslavia. 
Conclusion
In May 1945 new goals and plans were revealed with the rise of the new au-
thorities. The economic management was taken over by the communists, who, 
among other things, initiated accelerated industrialisation and introduced a 
centrally-planned economy together with nationalisation. Slovenia joined the 
second Yugoslav state as the economically best-developed part of the state 
and managed to retain this role. It excelled in many fields, especially exports, 
productivity, and investment efficiency. Its share of the social product in the 
context of Yugoslavia was between 15 and 17 percent, and its share of industry 
and exports was approximately 25 percent. In comparison with Slovenia, Yu-
goslavia fell behind more and more from decade to decade. According to the 
information the lag of Yugoslavia behind Slovenia, from the viewpoint of eco-
nomic development, amounted to as much as 17 years and a half in 1985. Until 
1974 Slovenia's possibilities for the realisation of its national economic inter-
ests were quite limited, but this changed with the constitution of 1974. With 
the strengthening of the role of the republics and provinces and reduction of 
the role of centralism, this constitution addressed the organisation of the fed-
eration and its functioning. On the other hand – with precise normative regu-
lation of socio-economic relations, based on self-management and associated 
labour – it emphasised the class-oriented, so-called labour-defined character 
of the Yugoslav society and state. However, even this constitution and numer-
ous reforms, taking place one after the other, failed to solve the problems in 
the economic field. Thus already in the end of the 1980s Yugoslavia no longer 
existed in the economic sense. Globally Slovenia was at the very top as far as 
the percentage of the employed of the whole or active population of Slovenia 
was concerned, as well as with regard to the percentage of people working in 
industry and mining. This, however, was not accompanied by suitable results 
in work productivity, educational structure of the employed, and the living 
standard, where Slovenia was very far from the leading states in the world. 
After the collapse of Yugoslavia, between 1989 and 1992 Slovenia saw a signifi-
cant decline in activity and faced an urgent reorientation from the Yugoslav to 
the Western markets. As far as the level of GDP was concerned, it took more 
than eight years to restore the level from 1989. In the statistical sense the 1992 
GDP level amounted to less than 80 percent of the level from 1989, but in the 
43 Borak, Ekonomski vidiki delovanja in razpada Jugoslavije, p. 194.
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temporal sense it fell to the level of around 1976, i.e. by some 16 years. Statisti-
cally the GDP reduction in Slovenia during the so-called transition depression 
was significantly higher than what we have witnessed during the current finan-
cial and economic crisis.  In 1988 the crisis of the Yugoslav economic system 
entered the final stage before the disintegration, which, however, has to be un-
derstood in a wider context or also outside of the Yugoslav context. In 1991 the 
dissolution of the bipolar division of the world, the decline of socialism as well 
as political and economic disputes in Yugoslavia and conflicts between the Yu-
goslav nations ultimately resulted in the Slovenian goal: the attainment of Slo-
venian independence and transformation into a capitalist system. Especially 
the loss of the 58-percent Yugoslav market pushed the Slovenian economy into 
a severe crisis. However, Slovenia was among the first countries to overcome 
the transformation depression, characteristic of the transition economies in 
the beginning of the 1990s, as the recovery of economic growth started with 
the restoration of national demand already in the middle of 1993.
Das Leben im zweiten Jugoslawien aus der Perspektive von aus-
gewählten Angaben (die Erfahrung Sloweniens)
Zusammenfassung
Nachdem die Kommunisten an die Macht gelangt waren, kamen neue Zie-
le und Pläne ans Licht. Die Kommunisten übernahmen wirtschaftliche Leitung 
des Staates und führten eine beschleunigte Industrialisierung, Kollektivwirt-
schaft und Nationalisierung ein. Slowenien trat in den neuen Staat als der in 
wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht am meisten entwickelte Teil des Staates ein und es 
gelang ihm, diese Rolle zu behalten. Slowenien spielte eine führende Rolle in 
verschiedenen Bereichen und vor allem in Export, Produktion und Investie-
rungen. Sein Anteil am jugoslawischen Bruttosozialprodukt betrug 15 bis 17 
%, während sein Anteil an Export und Industrie etwa 25 % war. Jugoslawien 
konnte in jedem Jahrzehnt immer weniger mit Slowenien Schritt halten. Nach 
gewissen wirtschaftlichen Angaben blieb Jugoslawien im Jahre 1985 sogar 17,5 
Jahre nach Slowenien zurück. Die Aussichten Sloweniens, seine wirtschaftli-
chen Ziele zu erreichen, waren bis 1974 ziemlich schwach gewesen, was sich 
mit der neuen im Jahre 1974 erlassenen Verfassung änderte. Indem sie die 
Rolle der Republiken und Provinzen stärkte und die Zentralisation milderte, 
reflektierte sich diese Verfassung auch in der Gestaltung und Funktionierung 
der gesamten Föderation. Auf der anderen Seite, durch die präzise normative 
Regelung der sozial-wirtschaftlichen auf Selbstverwaltung und vereinigter Ar-
beit basierten Verhältnisse wurde in der neuen Verfassung der klassenorienti-
erte, bzw. durch Arbeiter definierte Charakter der jugoslawischen Gesellschaft 
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und des Staates hervorgehoben. Aber, weder diese Verfassung, noch zahlrei-
che Reformen, die nacheinander folgten, konnten die wirtschaftliche Situation 
verbessern. Deswegen könnte man sagen, dass vom Ende der 1980-er Jahre 
Jugoslawien als ein Ganzes in wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht nicht mehr existierte. 
Slowenien hatte den höchsten Anteil an Berufstätigen in der Gesamtbevöl-
kerung Jugoslawiens sowie in der Industrie und im Bergbau. Das wurde aber 
von keinen entsprechenden Resultaten in Arbeitsproduktivität, Ausbildungs-
struktur der Berufstätigen und in Lebensstandard gefolgt, und deswegen blieb 
Slowenien weit unter dem Niveau der leitenden Staaten in der Welt. Nach dem 
Zerfall Jugoslawiens zwischen 1898 und 1992 erfuhr Slowenien eine starke 
Senkung der wirtschaftlichen Aktivität und musste sich eilig vom jugoslawi-
schen Markt nach westlichen Märkten umorientieren. Im Hinblick auf das 
Niveau des Bruttosozialprodukts dauerte es sogar acht Jahre, bis der Zustand 
aus dem Jahre 1989 wieder erreicht wurde. In statistischer Hinsicht betrug 
der Bruttosozialprodukt 1992 weniger als 80 % dessen aus dem Jahre 1989, 
und in chronologischer Hinsicht ging er etwa 16 Jahre zurück, auf das Niveau 
des Bruttosozialprodukts im Jahre 1976. Statistisch gesehen war die Senkung 
des Bruttosozialprodukts während der sog. Transitionsdepression bedeutend 
stärker als jene in der aktuellen wirtschaftlichen und finanziellen Krise. Das 
Ende der bipolaren Weltaufteilung, Zusammenbruch des Sozialismus und 
die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Uneinigkeiten in Jugoslawien sowie die 
Konflikte zwischen jugoslawischen Nationen im Jahre 1991 halfen Sloweni-
en, seine Ziele - die Unabhängigkeit Sloweniens und Transformation zum Ka-
pitalismus - zu erreichen. Der Verlust von 58 % des jugoslawischen Marktes 
versetzte die slowenische Wirtschaft in eine starke Krise. Slowenien war aber 
unter den ersten Staaten, die aus der Transitionsdepression ausging, die für die 
Wirtschaft der Transitionsstaaten zu Beginn der 1990er charakteristisch war. 
Das war schon um die Mitte des Jahres 1993 zu sehen und zwar aufgrund der 
Erneuerung der nationalen Nachfrage nach verschiedenen Waren.
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